Friendship, Altruism, and the Structure of

Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics.

 

M.A. Thesis by

John Patrick Piazza

Department of Classics, San Francisco State University.

May 2004.

 

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INTRODUCTION

Friendship is one of the more frequently discussed aspects of Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics (NE), most likely because it is one of the most accessible subjects in that work; accessible because we can all relate to some, if not all, of the relationships which are covered under the heading of the Greek word philia. These relationships form the basis of human life, insofar as we live our lives in communities and households, with friends, family, colleagues and spouses. By devoting such a large part of the NE to this subject, Aristotle is making the important point that, although philia is everywhere, rarely do we stop and think about these relationships, their nature, characteristics, and obligations in a critical way. As a result, we carry with us many diverse, and perhaps contradictory opinions about what it means to be a friend, applying such “principles” unthinkingly and inconsistently to the various relationships in our lives. Not only does this have a tremendous impact on others, but also on ourselves.  For even the most solitary contemplative life is supported in some way by a community, and, according to Aristotle, community is central to what we are as human beings.

          It is for this reason, I argue, that Aristotle’s discussion of friendship plays a much more central role in the NE as a whole than is commonly thought. But how Aristotle articulates this crucial point requires some investigation, for without an overall view of the NE, Books 8 and 9, which are commonly known as the “Friendship Books” do seem a bit strange: in his book on the NE, Francis Sparshott introduces his own discussion of friendship with this statement: “The massive discussion of friendship (philia) appears as an anomaly in the scheme of the Ethics. Nothing in what has gone before suggests any such continuation.” The important word for our discussion is “appears.” Indeed, these books of the NE have appeared to some scholars as formally, if not materially inconsistent with the rest of the NE in some way or another. But a closer look will reveal that these books can be connected to their surroundings, with much benefit for our understanding of the NE as a whole.

          Therefore it is my first assertion in this thesis that the placement of Aristotle’s discussion of friendship is as important to the NE as is the content of that discussion. In support of this, I will focus on references to philia and which occur before Books 8 and 9, particularly in Book 4, which foreshadow the increasingly urgent need for a detailed treatment of the ethical individual’s relationships to those who are closest to him. Throughout the first seven books, many aspects of Aristotle’s ethical plan are treated in close detail, but philia is mentioned either in passing, or in a way that is sufficient only for the present point; the need for a full discussion becomes more apparent the more Aristotle (and the reader) delves into his conception of the virtuous life. This need becomes apparent early on in his definitions of justice and virtue in general, for both concepts are inextricably linked with one’s relations with others. Once he has addressed pleasure in Book 7, one might think that Aristotle is ready to move on to the end or goal in Book 10, which is the godlike existence (as far as is possible for man) of contemplation, the highest activity of the highest part of the human soul, and the goal of all ethical training and practice, as well as the goal of society in providing for its members. Yet the reader still has a long ways to go, two whole books to be exact, before finally arriving at this supposed destination. I will argue that this delay is caused by the necessity of understanding one more concept, namely philia, in all its facets and manifestations, before the reader is permitted to move on to Book 10. The placement of his discussion of friendship seems only to add to this tension, for the reader has swum through so many of the important ethical issues already, all of which are pointing at happiness and contemplation, to which Aristotle so far has only alluded; we are so tantalizingly close, yet so very far from that key to the truly blessed life. We must also keep in mind that Books 8 and 9 are placed in between two discussions of pleasure, another crucial aspect of life. This juxtaposition of fundamental concepts around a detailed discussion of friendship suggests a unique angle of investigation which I believe can shed some light on our present subject, but in a more general way, namely for understanding the significance of Aristotle’s discussion of friendship within the context of the NE as a whole.

           Second, this thesis will address the current debate over whether or not we can see in Aristotle’s conception of philia a precursor to the modern notion of altruism. By applying the method described above, I argue that many of the current arguments in favor of an altruistic interpretation neglect an overall view of the place of philia in the NE, but rather are based in large part on a piecemeal approach, in which statements are taken out of context, and compared to other excised passages. All too often, Aristotle’s language of benefiting others over oneself has been taken out of the larger context of reciprocity provided by Aristotle via the conventions of Greek society. Aristotle’s ethical framework, as we will see, has little room for the entirely self-sacrificing sense of duty that, since Christian times, and especially since the time of Kant, has been equated with morality. Although the focus of this section is primarily on the question of altruism, it is only one example of how our understanding of Aristotle’s arguments can be clarified by approaching his works with this more unified view.              

          In the concluding section, I address how the detailed discussion of philia in Books 8 and 9 is related to what comes after, namely his discussions of pleasure and contemplation in Book 10, as well as the problematic preliminary discussion of pleasure in Book 7. From this investigation, it becomes clear that Aristotle’s conception of the fully actualized human life, which he describes as  godlike, cannot be separated from our connections with those around us. Aristotle’s intellectual ideal of human life may be a solitary activity, but it can only take place in a dynamic community which actively (and perhaps paradoxically) supports this kind of self-sufficiency on the part of its members. And, analogous to the reader’s initiation into the final book of the NE, Aristotle’s virtuous individual cannot reach the heights of human activity, the actualization of his true nature, without having first come to terms with his relationships with others, upon whose shoulders he must stand in order to reach those heights.